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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A SKEPTIC
RACHANA KAMTEKAR

1. GENERAL COMMENTS
In his stimulating book Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills
constructs a tradition of philosophical skepticism in Indian philosophy that cuts
across the now-standard classification of views as orthodox vs. heterodox and, among
the orthodox, as belonging to one of 6 darshanas. Insofar as he groups the Buddhist
Nagarjuna, the Charvakin Jayarashi, and the Advaitin Shri Harsha together as
skeptics, Mills is following in the footsteps of Matilal’s (1986, 28) grouping of these
three figures as “skeptical dialecticians who argued that the very concept of
knowledge was either paradoxical or circular”. However, in arguing that these
philosophers were skeptics about philosophy Mills hopes to show that they share a
good deal more with skeptics in other traditions, like Sextus Empiricus in Greek
philosophy and Zhuangzi in Chinese philosophy, than they do with contemporary
epistemological skepticism, which he associates with Descartes and DeRose.
To begin, I’d like to get clear on the phenomenon, skepticism about philosophy or
philosophical skepticism, which Mills distinguishes from epistemological skepticism.
A chart will be useful here:
Epistemological Skepticism
(a) a theoretical position

Skepticism about Philosophy
(a*) a way of life [without beliefs], which
results in some valued end-state,
(b) claims to state truths about knowledge (b*) aims at suspending belief; (also c*,
[which ought to be believed]
d*) argues against dogmatic philosophers
using the dogmatists’ own views, and
avoids adopting any views
c) on the basis of arguments that generate
an active mental state of doubt;
________________________
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d) arguments have the form: in order for including (b*, d*) views about criteria
a subject to know some fact, some further for knowing
epistemic condition must be met, but
since that condition isn’t met, the subject
does not know the first fact
Mills says that epistemological skepticism is (a) a theoretical position that (b) claims
to state truths about knowledge [which presumably ought to be believed] (c) on the
basis of arguments that generate an active mental state of doubt; (d) the arguments
have the form: in order for a subject to know some fact (e.g. that there is a fire in
front of him), some further epistemic condition must be met (e.g. he must know he’s
not dreaming), but since that condition isn’t met (he doesn’t know he’s not
dreaming), the subject does not have knowledge of the first fact (that there is a fire in
front of him) (Mills 2018, xxiii-xxiv; my enumeration differs from Mills’ in order to
make referring to the points I focus on in my comments easier, but I think the
substance is the same). By contrast, skepticism about philosophy aims at (b*)
suspending belief, and (or perhaps as a result) advocates (a*) a skeptical way of life
[without beliefs], which results in some valued end-state (e.g. freedom from
disturbance in Sextus, nirvana in Nagarjuna, enjoyment in Jayarashi). Further,
philosophical skeptics argue against dogmatic philosophers (b*, c*, d*) using the
dogmatists’ own views, and scrupulously avoid adopting any views themselves,
including (b*, d*) views about the criteria for knowing (xxiv-xxvii). In the
introduction Mills says his conception of skepticism about philosophy aims at “a
cultural expansion of the idea of skepticism...[and] a return to something much closer
to the original, Hellenistic understanding” (xxv), and in the conclusion he speculates
as to what features of thought make it the case that philosophical skepticism crops up
in so many different times and places.
This is heady stuff. But in the dreary role of critic, I would like to urge some
caution in the characterization of and contrast between these kinds of skepticism.
First, the contrast between modern skepticism’s focus on knowledge and
Pyrrhonism’s focus on belief (b, b*) seems to me misleading. Sextus is working with
his dogmatic (standard Stoic) interlocutors’ conceptions of belief and knowledge:
belief (doxa) is the result of an act of assent, and so is an occurrent judgment (which
can become dispositional); among beliefs are special grasps (katalêpseis) that
represent the object that caused them in such a way that they cannot be false; grasps
correspond to and are the ancestors of Descartes’ clear and distinct perceptions,
which are pieces of propositional knowledge. The Stoics reserve the term
‘knowledge’ (epistêmê, technê) for a system of special grasps that have been made
stable by their interconnections. It’s only because what the Stoics call knowledge
doesn’t take individual propositions as its object that when Sextus gives particular
arguments against particular views, he can only target what the Stoics call a belief or
the special species of belief, grasp. But in ordinary language his target would be
expressed as a bare assertion, e.g., ‘The earth is the center of the cosmos’ or a
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knowledge-claim, ‘I know that the earth is the center of the cosmos.’ In this case,
targeting belief rather than knowledge is a matter of nomenclature, not substance.
Perhaps Mills has in mind that Sextus’ reason for targeting these dogmatic mental
states is that they are a cause of disturbance rather than only that they may be false,
but then the contrast between focusing on knowledge vs. belief isn’t itself an
illuminating one.
Furthermore, does Sextus really target all beliefs for suspension? He says the
Skeptic suspends belief about non-evident things, or, equivalently, does not form
dogmatic beliefs, but does assent to the feelings which are the necessary results of
sense-impressions (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13-14), and “non-dogmatically” accepts
“the guidance of nature, the constraint of the passions, the tradition of laws and
customs, and the instruction of the arts”, “seeing that we cannot remain wholly
inactive.” (23-24, translations of Sextus, here and below, are mine). When we flesh
out the Skeptic way of life, Pyrrhonian skepticism may turn out to be a theoretical
position after all (a), if it only suspends belief about the class of beliefs that are ‘about
the non-evident’.
Second, because philosophy, even dogmatic philosophy, is critical, we need to
have a way to distinguish critical from skeptical positions: Parmenides argues that the
world delivered to us through sense-perception and opinion is impossible; Plato
criticizes the senses as giving us an inaccurate account of what the world is like. But
because these criticisms are the basis for their arguments about what reality must be
like, it would not be right to call them skeptics about philosophy (nor should we say
that they are methodological skeptics like Descartes because their criticism is
restricted to one means of knowledge). Similarly, I need more argument than Mills
provides that it is “articulation…of Upanishadic mystical skepticism” or a claim that
“knowledge of the atman is not gained through philosophical conceptualization…”
(8) when Yajnavalkya says to Maitreyi that [knowing?] the self “is like this. When a
drum is being beaten, you cannot catch the external sounds; you catch them only by
getting hold of the drum or the man beating the drum.” (Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
2.4.7, tr. Olivelle). Why skepticism or rejection of philosophical conceptualization
rather than, for example, an argument by analogy that the self must be grasped
indirectly? Clarity, and consistency with Mills’ initial characterization of skepticism,
would recommend reserving the label ‘skepticism’ for global pessimism about our
epistemic condition, and ‘skepticism about philosophy’ for a global pessimism about
philosophical methods in particular, whatever those turn out to be.
Third, while I don’t doubt that similar philosophical questions, answers, and
skeptical responses may be found in different traditions, it seems to me not at all
straightforward to locate counterparts in particular texts. So for example, Mills finds
Meno’s paradox of inquiry (“if one doesn’t know what virtue is, how will one
recognize it when one finds it”, 10-11) in Kena Upanishad 2.2 on knowing brahman:
I do not think/that I know it well;
But I know not/that I do not know.
Who of us knows that,/he does know that;
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But he knows not,/that he does not know (tr. Olivelle).

Although these dense verses can be interpreted in multiple ways, I cannot find in
them anything about the problem of recognizing the answer to your question when
you’ve got it. The KeU passage seems to me to say that even the one who is
appropriately cautious not to overstate the extent of his knowledge (“I do not think
that I know it well”) doesn’t know that he doesn’t know (no [na vedeti] veda cha), or
doesn’t know what he doesn’t know, or knows something and doesn’t know
something else of it. In the lines just before the quoted ones, the KeU considers a
distinct problem also raised by Plato, that of double ignorance: when you are
ignorant, you often don’t even know that you don’t know (Plato, Apology 21b-22e,
Laws 863c). But if we want to pursue Meno’s paradox as a consequence for inquiry
of not knowing not only that we don’t know whether we don’t know what there is to
know, but also that since we don’t know something, we don’t thereby know what it is
that we don’t know and can’t inquire, then we should remember that Meno’s paradox
asks not only the question Mills picks up, of how, in the absence of knowledge, you
can recognize the answer to your question when you have found it, but also the
question he inexplicably leaves out, of how your inquiry can be directed in the
absence of any knowledge (Plato, Meno 80d-e).1
But my comments will be very dreary indeed if they all take this form. So instead,
I would now like to explore some issues around (b*, c*, and d*), namely, the
suspension of belief and argumentation solely on the basis of the dogmatists’ own
views, focusing on Mills’ treatment of Nagarjuna, and introducing Sextus as a
comparandum. For the time being, I’ll accept Mills’ overall interpretation of
Nagarjuna as arguing against the views of other philosophers while not asserting any
thesis himself, and as aiming by these arguments at the cessation of conceptualization
and thereby attaining a liberatory end-state. Sextus also argues ‘non-dogmatically’
against the views of other philosophers, reports that as a result he is brought to
suspend belief, whereupon a good end-state, freedom from disturbance, follows. I’ll
then compare and contrast (1) the two philosophers’ practice of negative argument
and (2) the epistemic attitudes of suspension of belief and cessation of conceptual
proliferation.
According to Mills, early Buddhism had two strands: a practice of analysis
leading to insight, and quietism. Quietism adumbrates (1) the Buddha’s antispeculative attitude, for example, when he refuses to answer metaphysical questions
on the grounds that his teachings are for the sake of ending suffering, like a raft for
crossing over, not retaining (14-15 on Majhima Nikaya 1.426-32, 130-42); (2) the
Buddha’s recommendation to eliminate conceptual proliferation (papañca) in order to
rid oneself of attachment (16, on MN 1.110, cf. 17-18 for abandonment of views,
which seems like the same thing and is also described in terms of cessation of
1

Carpenter and Ganeri 2010 describe the paradox as concerning ‘the opacity of ignorance’, and trace
its treatment in a number of figures, including Shabara, Shankara and Sriharsha, with the last of these
figures treating it as a problem of aiming at an unknown.
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conceptualization); (3) the non-dogmatic conclusions of his negative arguments
against the self, such as the argument showing that the self, which is permanent and
exercises control, is not identical with the body, perception, consciousness, etc., the
result of which is disillusionment with these, which eliminates lust (16-17, on
Samyukta Nikaya 3.68). Mills makes the elegant proposal that Nagarjuna develops a
two-phase philosophy integrating analysis-to-insight and quietism, the first phase
giving anti-realist arguments for emptiness, and the second phase showing that the
thesis of emptiness is self-undermining, for if there is nothing for views to be about,
we should stop conceptualization. (Mills 2018, 35-41)
I have two worries about Mills’ general interpretation. First, Mills considers the
charge that it is logically inconsistent to make the claim that one is making no claim,
and answers it, following Thorsrud’s (2009) defense of Pyrrhonism, that insofar as
skepticism is a practice or way of life, “the charge of inconsistency is a category
mistake: ‘Just as it is neither consistent nor inconsistent to ride a bicycle, the practice
of skepticism, in so far as it is something the sceptic does, can be neither consistent
nor inconsistent’ ” (Mills 2018, 36). But it’s not because riding a bicycle is a practice
that consistency and inconsistency are irrelevant to riding a bicycle; it’s because the
practice doesn’t involve any actions that are evaluable for consistency or
inconsistency. (Imagine if your student in Introduction to Philosophy said to you,
‘Yes, I did say that there is no God, and that there is a God, but studying philosophy
is my way of life, so it’s a category mistake to accuse me of inconsistency!’) Insofar
as the practice of skepticism involves making claims (according to Mills in
Nagarjuna’s phase 1, and then in phase 2 about phase 1), and claims are evaluable for
consistency or inconsistency, the skeptic is also evaluable for consistency or
inconsistency. It’s no good for the skeptic to say that she isn’t making claims at all,
since the force of her anti-dogmatic arguments depends on her making some claims,
even if they are only conditional ones.
Second, Mills considers the objection that Nagarjuna couldn’t be a Buddhist if he
is a skeptic and answers by appeal (again) to Thorsrud on Sextus, that “for
Pyrrhonians religion is a kind of behavior rather than a kind of belief” (Mills 2018,
41), and that Sextus says that “Pyrrhonians can engage in religious rituals and be
pious toward the gods without having any religious beliefs”. For the record, what
Sextus actually reports is that Skeptics “say undogmatically that there are gods and
revere gods and say that they exercise providence” (Outlines 3.3, my tr.). This is not a
matter of ritual rather than belief, but (again) of nondogmatic belief or assertion (on
which see more below). But further, suppose that it’s true that in Greek religion piety
is a matter of ritual rather than belief; why should the same hold in an intellectual
tradition like Buddhism with its emphasis on right view and teaching? This is not to
say that Nagarjuna can’t be a Skeptic, but it is to say that if he is a Skeptic there’s
some tension between that and his Buddhism.
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2. PRESUPPOSITIONLESS ARGUMENTS
I’ll now turn to a couple of Nagarjuna’s arguments in greater detail. In
Vigrahavyavartani (VV) 30-51 Nagarjuna is replying to an objector who, after
attacking (and here I’ll just quote Mills) “the coherence of [the] concept of emptiness
(sunyata)”, argues, “if the means of knowledge (pramanas) are empty of essence,
they cannot yield knowledge; thus Nagarjuna cannot give an epistemologically sound
reason to believe that all things lack essences” (Mills 2018, 53). According to Mills,
Nagarjuna’s reply “denies that he is trying to apprehend anything through perception,
inference, or any other means of knowledge, and thus the Nyaya objection is off base,
since the opponent is accusing him of not being able to do something he was never
trying to do in the first place” and then “launches into a critique of the means of
knowledge”, concluding with “a rejection of the five options for establishing the
pramanas” (Mills 2018, 54).
Mills describes Nagarjuna’s reply as a five-fold prasanga argument. In making a
prasanga argument, one simply draws out consequences of the opponent’s view that
the opponent would find unwelcome, without committing oneself to either the view
or the consequences. Readers of ancient Greek philosophy will recognize this as
similar to one kind of elenctic argument Plato has Socrates make in his dialogues,
e.g., if the interlocutor says, ‘Justice is truth-telling and returning what you owe’, the
philosopher might reply, ‘So on your account, it’s just to return a weapon you’ve
borrowed from a friend when he’s gone mad?’. Although much of Mills’ brief
discussion is taken up with establishing the superiority of his own skeptical
interpretation of VV over Westerhoff’s ‘contextualist’ interpretation, according to
which Nagarjuna is developing “an epistemology that incorporates empty epistemic
instruments” (Westerhoff 2010, 55-56), I would like to focus on how the prasanga
arguments themselves are supposed to work.2
To get a taste for these arguments, let’s consider two:
(1) Against the view that the pramanas need to be established by other pramanas,
Nagarjuna argues: an infinite regress follows (VV 31-32).
(2) Against the view that the pramanas are self-establishing, like fire, which is
self-illuminating, Nagarjuna argues:
(a) since to illuminate is to light up something that was previously in the dark,
fire does not illuminate itself (34); if fire were self-illuminating it would
also be self-consuming [rather than fuel-consuming] (35); if fire
illuminated itself then its opposite, darkness, would obscure itself (36);
since to illuminate is to destroy darkness, there will have to be darkness in
the fire for it to illuminate itself (37); the arising fire does not connect with
darkness [because it excludes it] (38); if fire could drive out darkness

2

Because Mills is very quick with the VV arguments themselves, I provide my own detailed
reconstruction below where needed.
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without connecting with it, then fire here could drive out darkness
everywhere (39)3
(b) if the pramanas were self-establishing, they would not be means of
knowing anything [but it’s necessary, if something is to be a means of
knowledge, that it actually result in an episode of knowing, prama] (4041)
...
In VV 51, Nagarjuna summarizes the conclusions of his prasanga arguments: The
means of knowledge are not (1) self-established, nor (2) mutually established, nor (3)
established by other means of knowledge, nor (4) established by the objects of
knowledge, nor (5) established without reason.
Mills says that the conclusion of a prasanga argument is the denial of the view
whose unwelcome consequences have been drawn out, which does not, however,
imply any alternative view. Such a denial is an “illocutionary negation”, or
“commitmentless denial” of the opponent’s thesis (Mills 2018, 52). He explains,
using “the stock example”: whereas ‘This is a non-Brahmin’ (paryudasa negation)
implies the existence of a person belonging to some other class, ‘It is not the case that
this is a Brahmin’ (prasajya negation) doesn’t entail the existence of a person at all.
But illocutionary negation and commitmentless denial seem to me to be different
analyses, with different implications. Matilal, the source of the illocutionary
interpretation of prasajya negation, illustrates it with Sanjaya’s “I do not say that
there is an afterlife”, where ‘I do not say’ negates an assertion (viz. there is an
afterlife), but without committing Sanjaya to asserting that there is no afterlife.
(Matilal 1986, 88-89). From someone’s saying ‘I do not say P’, it can’t be inferred
what he does say about P.
‘I do not say this is a Brahmin’ would be illocutionary negation. But a sentence
that begins ‘It is not the case that’ seems to be (qua illocution) an assertive, and the
assertion ‘It is not the case that this is a Brahmin’ does seem to take on some
commitments from the assertion that it negates, viz., that there exists some ‘this’,
which is not a Brahmin. True, ‘this’ could refer to a statue, or a tree, or some vaguely
designated region of space, but refer it must. In the literature on presuppositions,
‘this’ is a presupposition-trigger.4
Westerhoff (cited in Mills’ notes), who distinguishes the kinds of negations in
terms of their different presuppositions, says that the distinction is originally
grammatical. In prasajya negation it is the verb that is negated: brahmana nasti; in

3

I take it these arguments aren’t just about fire, but about self-illumination or self-certification, where
the basic notion involves a change from one state to its contrary, from dark to light or ignorance to
awareness. According to these arguments, the reflexive ‘self-‘ ‘’is incompatible with that change of
state. The arguments seem to have the same structure as Aristotle’s argument against self-motion in
Physics 8.
4
Beaver and Geurts 2014
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paryudasa negation, it is the noun: abrahmana asti. 5 But unfortunately for
philosophers, there is no natural language in which presupposition-preserving and
presupposition-cancelling negations are realized by different lexical items. Indeed,
the diagnosis of what is presupposed by a sentence is often made on the basis of
whether it is projected when embedded in the negation of the sentence; for example,
‘The present king of France is bald’ is thought to presuppose that there is a present
king of France, in part because it is also presupposed in, ‘The present king of France
isn’t bald’ or ‘It isn’t the case that the present king of France is bald’. Now
Westerhoff represents the paryudasa negation ‘The present king of France is not
bald’ as ∃x (Kx & -Bx), and contrasts it with the prasajya negation ‘It is not the case
that the present king of France is bald’ which he represents as -∃x (Kx & Bx). The
latter, but not the former, allows that there is no present king of France. But
entailment and presupposition are not the same.6 It’s possible that Nagarjuna and his
opponent7 are thinking of commitments as entailments rather than presuppositions,
and this would be interesting. But if they are thinking of presuppositions, the question
I want to raise is: how can Nagarjuna determine that none his negations will inherit
any presuppositions from the sentences he negates?8
I can think of two ways: one is for him to say explicitly: ‘I cancel all
presuppositions of my utterances’, but I’m not sure he could keep arguing after this,
given how much we presuppose in communicating (the same goes for negating by
saying ‘No!’ or ‘You’re wrong!’: the only way to continue arguing after this depends
on presuppositions about what has been negated). A possibly more constructive,
because more specific, alternative suggested by Sextus attempts to cancel the
presupposition that his sentences make assertions about a mind-independent reality by
explaining that they are really reports. 9 For to distinguish Skepticism from a
superficially similar negative dogmatism, according to which the truth is
inapprehensible (Outlines 1.3), Sextus says, “we do not positively affirm that the fact
is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears
5

Westerhoff 2007 thinks that the distinction between choice and exclusion negation, where choice
negation assumes that the object falls under a property or its opposite, and exclusion doesn’t, is not
quite the same distinction, because the prasajya-paryudasa distinction isn’t ever connected to
categories, but allows that the choice-exclusion contrast might be one kind of prasajya-paryudasa
distinction; perhaps the illocutionary-propositional distinction is another kind.
6
As Beaver and Geurts 2014 point out, “It’s the knave that stole the tarts” presupposes a salient and
identifiable knave and entails that the knave did something illegal. “It isn’t the knave that stole the
tarts” still presupposes the salient and identifiable knave but does not entail that the knave did anything
illegal.
7
As Westerhoff 2007 explains (b), in Nyaya the negation, ‘X is not Y’ is analyzed as ‘X is not
combined with Y’, where absence of Y is a property attributed to X. For such a negation to be sensical,
there must be an X, and a Y (so that ‘X’ and ‘Y’ refer), and for the negation to be true, existing X and
existing Y aren’t combined. This is on the assumption that terms either denote something existing or
are nonsensical. The only way for a cognition to be false is for it to miscombine terms for existing
things in a way they are not combined in reality.
8
Galloway 1989 says that prasajya negation is more radical in Madhyamaka than the realists, not just
predicate-negation or complement negation but term negation.
9
Sextus’ move does seem to be illocutionary negation—noted by Matilal 1992, 7.
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to us at the moment” (1.4). In other words, he is denying that the illocutionary force
of his statements is affirmation or denial about how things really are apart from how
they appear, and telling us that his statements are instead reports of how things appear
to him, like the statement, ‘I’m cold’.
Sextus devotes several sections of Outlines (1.187-209) to how skeptical
expressions should be understood:
‘No more this than that’ is said by the skeptic to mean ‘I know not which of these I ought
to assent to’ (a report) or ‘why/for what reason this rather than that?’ (a question) (1.18891);
‘Non-assertion’ is neither affirming nor denying anything about anything non-apparent
(1.192-93);
‘I determine nothing’ means ‘I am now in such a state of mind as neither to affirm
dogmatically nor to deny any of the matters now in question (1.197);
‘All things are non-apprehensible’ means ‘All the non-apparent matters of dogmatic
inquiry which I have investigated appear to me non-apprehensible’ (1.200).

But does Sextus’ strategy for cancelling presuppositions by stipulating their
illocutionary force work? Maintaining that one’s assertions are always reports of how
things seem to one, never dogmatic pronouncements about how things are apart from
how they seem to one, may seem to be as much of a cheat as stipulating that one’s
negations don’t inherit any presuppositions from the statements they negate. Myles
Burnyeat has argued that Sextus’ distinction between belief and appearance, or
assertion and report, is in some cases merely verbal and that some of his so-called
reports are really beliefs by another name. 10 I can sensibly suspend the belief that it’s
cold today on the grounds that while I feel cold, it may not actually be cold (perhaps I
have a fever). But can I suspend the belief that 700+200=900, while reporting that it
seems to me on the basis of addition that 700+200=900? What else is believing that
700+200=900 if not having it appear to one on the basis of addition that it is? But if
what it is for me to believe that the statement p is true or to assent to p is that it appear
to me that p on the basis of reasoning about p, then it looks like even though he says
he is merely reporting, Sextus is actually stating a belief when he says, “To every
dogmatic claim I have examined there appears to me to be opposed a rival dogmatic
claim which is equally worthy and equally unworthy of belief” (Outlines 1.203).
In the above, I have tried to identify and evaluate the strategies by which
Nagarjuna and Sextus might try to argue against dogmatists without having any views
of their own. I turn now to the attitudes they recommend taking towards views.
3. PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SUSPENSION OF BELIEF VS. CESSATION OF
CONCEPTUALIZATION
Sextus concludes his long discussion of the criterion, the analogue to the means of
knowledge, “the criterion of truth has appeared to be unattainable” (Outlines 2. 95).
10

Burnyeat 1980.
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But Sextus rejects ‘nothing is true’ as a self-refuting view. (91) Instead, the upshot of
his arguments is that he is not (yet) in a position to form a judgment/belief about the
criterion (whether it exists, what, if it exists, it is, etc.), and so must suspend belief
about it. What kind of ‘must’ is this? If psychological, then the mechanism of belief
formation is such that you’ll only assent to P if the evidence for P is stronger than the
evidence for -P. Since the Skeptic’s ability consists in opposing evidence of equal
strength on both sides of an issue, he can’t form a belief and must suspend. If ‘must’
is rational, i.e., if skepticism is a rational practice, he’ll decide to suspend judgment
because the warrant for P and -P are equal. Indeed, Sextus characterizes the skeptic as
one who continues investigating (zêtousi [1.4], skepsesthai [1.7]), which indicates that
he is open to the possibility that there is a criterion of truth, and in general, about each
thing he discusses, a mind-independent reality to be discovered.
The comparison with Sextus raises the question: Why is the effect of Nagarjuna’s
prasanga arguments not to leave the philosopher in aporia, admitting that she doesn’t
know how the means of knowledge are established, and as a result whether they can
be established? In the circumstances, she might even wonder if she knows what a
means of knowledge is. Still, wouldn’t this be a reason to try to find out? If she has
no idea about how to find out, mightn’t she ask around, try out different accounts of
means of knowledge (rather than examining just the different candidates of
perception, inference, testimony)? Isn’t cessation of conceptualization a rash response
to the arguments, insofar as the arguments don’t obviously identify conceptualization,
rather than ignorance, as the problem? Or perhaps what’s rash is the prior conclusion
that the means of knowledge are empty, or lack svabhava, which is what prompts the
discussion of the VV. In either case, compared with suspension of belief, emptiness or
cessation of conceptualization seems to me a dogmatic response, insofar as they put
an end to inquiry and not only dogma. On the other hand, the fact that Sextus does not
think to impugn our concepts despite having collected so many conflicting
conceptions from the dogmatists, of e.g. cause, body, time, etc., raises interesting
questions about a road not taken. Instead of concluding, ‘we cannot determine,
concerning cause, whether it exists or does not exist’, it seems an oversight not to
wonder: ‘how could anything answer to those specifications?’
In any event, the difference between suspension of belief and cessation of
conceptualization suggests that Sextus is not among the philosophers who “use
philosophical arguments to cure their readers of the desire to do philosophy” (62).
Insofar as Sextus is offering a cure, it is for dogmatism, but dogmatism is attachment
to a view, not the desire to do philosophy. One might, however, question whether
Sextan investigation is really investigative, a genuine search for truth, or whether,
contrary to his self-presentation, its search for evidence on either side of a question
isn’t in fact for the sake of producing suspension.
Perhaps Nagarjuna’s ‘cease conceptualization’ is not supposed to follow, either
psychologically or rationally, from prasanga arguments, in the way that suspension
of belief is supposed to be a consequence of equipollent arguments; perhaps it is just
supposed to be a practical recommendation, so that even if conceptualization hasn’t
been established as the problem, cessation of conceptualization is a cure. In this
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respect it would reflect the quietist strain of early Buddhism in which Mills finds its
origin.
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